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This paper explores the impact of two interest groups, merchants and 
Protestant missionaries, upon American foreign policy toward China in the 
nineteenth century. Examining their influence upon American policy sheds light 
upon the supposedly "radical departure" of the Open Door Notes. The paper 
discusses three distinct eras: American relations with China prior to the 
establishment of the treaty port system, the effects of the treaty port system on 
American activities in China from 1860 until 1890, and the immediate backdrop of 
the 1890s to Secretary of State John Hay's production of the Open Door Notes. The 
Open Door Policy was consistent with prior statements of American ideology yet 
was also a product of America's changed power status and altered perception of vital 
interests. Thus the Open Door was both old and new. 
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u.s. government activities vis-a-vis China in the nineteenth century were 
influenced by considerations that have often influenced American policy: the quest 
for souls and silver. American ideals and interests were naturally formed in 
accordance with the United States' perception of its capabilities and the anticipated 
response of the world community, in view of vocal U.S. public opinion largely 
swayed by merchants and missionaries. This policy had to be flexible enough to 
respond to relative shifts in the world balance of power, the changed attitudes or 
involvement of U.S. citizens, heightened U.S. capacities to promote strategies which 
best suited its interests, and individual Administrations' objectives, all of which 
characterized the divergent 1890s. The U.S. had fairly consistently upheld its ideals 
and interests, the promotion of free trade and the security of American citizens in 
the Far East, under changing conditions from mid-century until 1900. By the turn of 
the century new ideological currents, increased missionary fervor, preoccupation 
with industrial overproduction, rising anti-foreign sentiment among the Chinese, 
and perceived threats to the U.S. position in Asia by European powers had 
developed an atmosphere favorable to the official promulgation of the Open Door 
Policy. The United States therefore actively promoted a policy which it had actually 
followed from its earliest engagements in China. 
The earliest American ties to China involved trade. From 1784, when the 
merchant vessel Empress of China sailed from New York to Canton, Americans 
associated the Orient with profitable commerce. Alexander Hamilton summed up 
Federalist sentiment in the late 1700s when he expressed that China offered "an 
additional and extensive field for the enterprise of our merchants and mariners and 
an additional outlet for the commodities of the country."l The China trade was 
established by adventuresome American entrepreneurs, but the government sought 
to foster their activity through diplomacy. When early merchants petitioned their 
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political leaders to lend support to this lIincreasing and profitable branch of 
commerce," the Washington granted favorable tariff treatment to Chinese goods, 
maintained an honorary consul at Canton, and attempted negotiations with Britain 
to open India to Americans in search of goods to sell in China.2 
In the early nineteenth century the government wanted to augment 
American exports to China, but trade was restricted by the Qing Dynasty to the port 
of Canton. The Americans also had difficulty in finding a commodity for which 
there was considerable demand in China. The major American export to China was 
ginseng, but a greater profit could be made by smuggling opium, which was illegal. 
While British merchants became frustrated with the Chinese and indignant toward 
their restrictions, American merchants advised the U.S. government against doing 
anything that might cause China to retaliate against their business. British 
merchants provoked the Chinese with their opium from India in an effort to 
expand their gains from trade, and dared local officials in Canton to interfere with 
their activity. The American government had acknowledged China's right to 
prohibit opium smuggling and openly declared that it would not attempt to protect 
any American ship caught in the act of smuggling. 
Witnessing the trouble the British were stirring, the American merchants 
importuned Congress not to go too far in pressing China to grant, by treaty, rights 
which they had already secured by personal and private understanding. They 
wished to avoid radical change, as the small number of American IIChina hands" 
were enjoying profits and relative freedoms from a system they hoped would 
remain intact. The initial American attempt to place relations with China on a 
treaty basis came in the 1830s, during the administration of Andrew Jackson. The 
Jacksonians sought the expansion of trade, so the President sent Edmund Roberts, 
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an official in the U.S. consular service, on a mission to find new commercial 
opportunities in the Orient. Besides attempting to secure mutually beneficial trade, 
Roberts was told to make the Chinese aware that lIit is against the principles of our 
nation to build forts, or make expansive establishments in foreign countries" and 
that "we never make conquests as the English, the French, and the Dutch have 
done.,,3 
Although his mission failed to establish communications with the local 
Chinese authorities, it reveals the aims of American diplomacy and the outlook of 
Americans. Americans believed they had a special message for mankind. They felt 
they were a new breed of people, compared with the Europeans. They believed in 
egalitarian democracy and small government. They believed they possessed a 
superior way of life both materially and spiritually than any other empire they 
might come up against. As a result Americans were very expansive and self-
righteous. Such sentiment can be discerned in the following excerpt from a mid-
nineteenth century journal: 
There is a God in history, and the finger of an Almighty 
providence is evident in many events which have marked 
the march of America. More than human wisdom has 
thrown open that Western portal of our land, and welcomed 
over its threshold the natives of a nation as old as tradition, 
and until now, as immobile as their own stone-eyed Boodh. 
When China, the hoary type of antiquity, embraced America, 
the young bride of futurity, we may be sure that it was 
prophetic of more than mere gold-digging for both.4 
Roberts' arrival had stimulated anxieties in the American merchant 
community. Some merchants feared that the attempt to obtain a commercial treaty 
would antagonize the Chinese, seem less than properly submissive, and hurt 
existing trade rather than expand it.S Stephen Lockwood asserts that the merchants 
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took this position because in their competitive struggle they exploited the Qing 
Dynasty's inability to enforce its laws, and bribed corrupt officials whenever 
possible.6 In trade, coastal shipping, up-country purchasing, and opium 
importation the merchants enjoyed relative freedom and advantages. 
Just as the British merchants could be more belligerent with the Chinese 
because they were supported by the Royal Navy, the American stance was proper in 
order to maintain their merchant interests. Regardless of the Jacksonian expansive 
outlook, the United States was not prepared to make a large military commitment 
to the Far East. The costs of maintaining a forceful Asian presence would be too 
great for the relatively new nation. John Fairbank, in Chinese-American 
Interactions, asserts that although China was regarded as a "field of adventure and 
enterprise for private individuals, it was not an object of great national concern at 
the governmental level.,,7 
The indifferent attitude of the American government toward China was 
symptomatic of U.S. foreign policy in general in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. America was occupied with its continental expansion, and U.S. 
isolationism was prevalent in popular opinion. It sufficed the interests of the 
United States government to follow a policy of benign neglect regarding China, and, 
as Thomas Bailey wrote of the era, "the student of diplomacy finds little of 
significance to record."S 
China was a field of interest for the American Protestant missionaries, but 
Christianity was forbidden in the 1830s. The first American missionaries to arrive 
in Canton braved a Chinese promise of death by strangulation for anyone caught 
proselytizing.9 Because of this threat, after only a short stay in Canton or Macao 
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most American missionaries went to regions in Southeast Asia to learn the Chinese 
language from Chinese communities under Western supervision. From mission 
centers in Malacca, Java, Batavia, Penang, and Singapore missionaries awaited the 
chance to get to the China mainland.10 
The American missionary enterprise in China was an outgrowth of the great 
religious revival experienced in the Northeastern United States in the early 19th 
century. In this Second Great Awakening, preachers called from the pulpit for a 
revitalized Christianity to meet the challenge of a secularizing society. In 1816 the 
Boston Recorder announced: 
Behold, fellow Christians of the United States, what a field 
of usefulness, what scenes of blessedness are unfolding to your 
view. American ships are soon to sail for Canton, to accumulate 
worldly treasure by the importation of the products of China: 
Let them not depart without carrying with them some testimony, 
that the American Christians take an interest in the spiritual 
welfare of that nation, who have contributed so largely to the 
temporal wealth of the United States.ll 
Thus to the existing commercial involvement of Americans in China was added a 
religious involvement, an especially Arminian desire to bring the Chinese into the 
kingdom of God. The missionary felt responsible for the spiritual fate of the 
heathen overseas. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
stated in its eighteenth annual report of 1827 that the object of foreign missions was 
"no less than the moral rejuvenation of the world." 12 Missionaries were 
encouraged to export salvation, and their superior culture. 
Due to their sense of spiritual obligation, the missionaries were frustrated by 
the hostility of the Chinese and the regulations against traveling inland and 
building churches. They recommended aggressive action to open China. By 1838 
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Reverend David Abeel and Rev. W. Orr were arguing that more than civil 
disobedience was necessary to break down the Chinese restrictions on their efforts to 
proselytize in the Celestial Empire. Nothing short of "an armed invasion, hopefully 
carried out by an Anglo-American expeditionary force" would "sweep away the 
hateful barriers to the gospel", resulting in "progress" for China and the world.13 
By 1839, missionaries were in favor of war to open China. In that year 
Commissioner Lin provided the British Admiralty with a casus belli by confiscating 
opium belonging to British merchants in Whampoa. While some American 
merchants condemned the British Opium War as "one of the most unjust wars ever 
waged by one nation against another," other merchants' perceptions of their 
opportunities had changed as a result of apparent British success.14 Some traders 
became more supportive of U.S. governmental intervention because they did not 
want Britain to gain a tremendous advantage at the expense of their business. 
Heartened by the concessions the British were able to obtain for themselves through 
force, Americans in Canton asked Congress for a commissioner to negotiate a 
commercial treaty, and for warships "to keep the natives friendly".15 
Many American missionaries praised the war and demanded that China 
must ''bend or break." For the missionaries, legal justification for the Opium War 
was transcended by the will of God. In an ecumenical spirit binding 
Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Southern Baptists, the war in 
Asia was agreed upon as the "scheme of the God of nations ... to open a highway for 
those who would preach the Word." John Fairbank asserts in his book, The 
Missionary Enterprise in China and America, that ''between 1840 and 1900 every 
W estern invasion of China was almost unanimously conceived of by American 
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missionaries as an act of Providence." An overwhelming amount seemed to feel 
that "force alone would break down their [the Chinese] minds and compel the 
Chinese to abandon their haughty isolation." 16 In describing the slaughter of 
Chinese soldiers by the Royal Navy and Marines in his journal, Southern Baptist J. 
Lewis Shuck wrote, "I regard such scenes ... as the direct instruments of the Lord in 
clearing away the rubbish which impedes the advancement of Divine Thuth.,,17 
Some later missionary accounts did show regret for the use of force, as Peter 
Matson wrote in his bibliography, lithe only sad thing about it was that China did 
not open her doors of her own accord, but only under compulsion by Western 
military power.,,18 On the whole, the atrocities of the Opium War were viewed as a 
necessary evil. Violence as a means to open China was either welcomed or at least 
accepted by God's people as His mysterious way to save the Chinese. American 
missionaries hoped to gain treaty privileges as a result of the Opium War, but this 
religious doctrine seems morally skewed. 
The war resulted in several unequal treaties negotiated with China by the 
powers of the West. Although American soldiers did not participate in the Opium 
War, the American government was encouraged by both merchants and 
missionaries to obtain advantages given to Great Britain, so that trade could remain 
fair and China could be opened to Christianity. The activity of the U.S. government 
has been referred to by many recent historians as "jackal diplomacy," or the attempt 
of American envoys to reap the same spoils as the British without putting forth the 
same effort. 
Some aspects of jackal diplomacy motivated President Tyler to send Caleb 
Cushing to Emperor Dao Guang in 1843. Secretary of State Daniel Webster clearly 
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expressed U.S. ambitions when he instructed Cushing to "secure the entry of 
American ships and cargoes into Amoy, Ningpo, Shanghai, and Fuchow in terms as 
favorable as those which are enjoyed by English merchants.,,19 This instruction was 
the first official statement on U.S. policy towards China. The policy aim was "to 
establish the means of friendly commercial intercourse.,,20 While the supreme task 
of the mission was to secure all the privileges wrung from China by British 
gunboats, Webster also stressed that the mission be viewed by the Chinese as 
"entirely pacific," offering "respect and goodwill to the greatest Empire in Asia.,,21 
Because of Cushing's mission, the United States gleaned the benefits of the Treaty of 
Nanjing, which stipulated a "fair and regular tariff," and was able to negotiate the 
1844 Treaty of Wangxia.22 It imposed fixed tariff duties, unilateral most-favored-
nation treatment, and harsher obligations in regard to extraterritoriality on the 
Chinese, because Cushing wanted to obtain privileges beyond those granted to the 
British. The Treaty of Wangxia marks the beginning of recognized official relations 
between the United States and China. 
After the Treaty of Wangxia, American trade with China expanded. From 
1845-1860 the total volume of trade rose from $9.5 million to $22.5 million.23 In the 
two decades following the establishment of the treaty port system, foreign trade 
increased along the China coast. After the U.S. westward expansion reached the 
Pacific coast, the Americans became confident that they were destined to dominate 
the trade of East Asia. 
The bulk of trade between China and the West at mid-century was carried on 
by Western merchants organized in trading firms that pooled entrepreneurial talent, 
.- capital, and business connections. Known as commission houses, they were the 
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characteristic institution of the treaty ports; from their headquarters in these ports 
they carried out operations necessary to secure China teas and silks for luxury 
consumption in the United States. The larger American commission houses had 
close contacts with officers and diplomats. Western diplomats often relied on the 
knowledge and opinions of resident merchants who, in the middle of the 19th 
century, had had the most contact with the Chinese. Augustine Heard and 
Company was one of the American houses in Canton. The company maintained 
contacts with important officials in the hope that it would be favored with 
information or contracts. The description below depicts the atmosphere of the 
commission houses and their familiarity with officialdom: 
Our house has become a rendezvous for the (Anglo-French) 
squadron, a sort of military and diplomatic club and every 
afternoon our front portico has become the fashionable 
lounging place for officers and men of leisure.24 
Such associations had impact in respect to merchant influence on official 
governmental policy. Yet while Lockwood focuses great detail and attention to the 
merchant's effect on diplomacy under the treaty port system, John Fairbank 
repudiates the merchant's importance on American China policy, saying that the 
U.S. sent "a commissioner out to China only occasionally, did not bother to send a 
paid consul until after 1854," and even then did not rely on specially trained 
consular officers, but rather appointed merchant-consuls who might have had 
private interests in the China market but who did not really affect American policy 
or national opinion regarding the China trade.25 Perhaps these daily rendezvous 
with diplomats which Campbell describes had little impact on U.S. China policy, and 
were really sodal gatherings with more importance for the financial success of 
Augustine Heard and Company. 
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Hostilities between China and Britain continued throughout the 1850s. 
Washington maintained a resolutely pacific policy despite pressures from 
merchants, missionaries, and others favoring the use of force. For the 
administration to condone American participation in the Anglo-Chinese conflict 
would betray the American self-perception of being a new breed and violate the 
isolationist tendencies of a citizenry which scorned entangling alliances and the 
colonial conquests of the Europeans. However, in a pragmatic way the U.S. did 
capitalize on the opportunities created by the Europeans to negotiate advantages 
with the vulnerable Chinese. 
Merchants and missionaries both disagreed with the U.S. government on its 
proper role in China. In late 1856 the Chinese fired on the American flag in the 
trading center at Canton and the American squadron returned gunfire, but 
Washington authorities were unwilling to sanction further military action.26 
Merchants feared without the use of force, Americans would be perceived by the 
Chinese as weak. Speaking on behalf of a strong military and diplomatic show of 
force to improve his company's position in trade, Augustine Heard said, liThe first 
element to impress the oriental is power.,,27 This reasoning was and remains a key 
ingredient in American ignorance of another culture in the conduct of foreign 
policy. The American government responded to similar comments by saying: 
We are not party to the existing hostilities and have no 
intention to interfere in their political concourse, or gain 
a foothold in their country. We go there to engage in trade, 
but under suitable guarantees for its protection. The 
extension of our commercial intercourse must be the work 
of individual enterprise, and to this element of our national 
character we may safely leave it.28 
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This passage affirms the sentiment that free trade was part of the American's nature. 
Perhaps justly reflecting the economic stake of the Americans, the official U.S. 
position was that trade must be protected, but not assisted by the military. 
Some merchants agreed with the governmental policy, as J.J. Moore wrote in 
an editorial in a merchant tract entitled "China and the Indies: Our Manifest 
Destiny" that U.S. merchants should peacefully penetrate the Asiatic countries and 
concentrate on the Pacific rather than the Atlantic, and be ready "to advance more 
boldly with our wares and fabrics into a quarter of the globe to which we have been 
too long comparative strangers.,,29 
Washington's response to the missionary pressure for force to further open 
China to the Gospel was to announce that the missionaries lIare not specially 
charged with the diplomatic functions of their government.,,30 When Peter Parker, 
a former missionary and the American Commissioner in China in 1856, wrote the 
State Department favoring American occupation of Taiwan, the Department replied: 
This country, you will constantly bear in mind, is not at 
war with the Government of China, nor does it seek to 
enter into that empire for any other purpose than those 
of lawful commerce, and for the protection of lives and 
property of its citizens ... 31 
The U.S. Government firmly refused to be associated with any armed intervention 
in China, and reiterated that the United States did not seek to obtain any territorial 
concessions. 
The missionaries pressed harder for U.S. governmental retaliation when 
American missionaries and their converts were massacred at TIentsin in 1858. The 
government responded by seeking a revised treaty with China through its 
diplomatic agent, William B. Reed. The Treaty of TIentsin negotiations were 
--
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assisted by several missionaries who served as interpreters. These interpreters had 
influence on the outcome of the treaty, as it not only benefited merchants but also 
contained several Toleration Clauses which addressed missionary interests. These 
clauses opened new cities to foreigners, gave missionaries the right to travel in the 
interior of China, opened the Yangtze River to foreign ships, and provided that 
neither the missionaries nor the Chinese converts ''be interfered with or 
molested.,,32 In the words of Covenant Church missionary Peter Matson, "Thus 
were the doors to the closed country opened. It was in answer to many prayers by 
God's people in Western lands."33 
Prior to the 1860s, by supporting certain actions of Americans in the Orient 
and rejecting others, the American government had created a policy position. One 
aim of a nation's foreign policy is to use its power to attain the most benefit for itself 
in its relations with other countries. The U.S. at this time was a weak and 
underdeveloped power which did not have the means to exercise political or 
military ambitions in East Asia. American interests were restricted to trade and 
missionary work, so the government's reactions to events in China and to the 
requests of American merchants and missionaries were consistent with its desire to 
achieve the protection of its interests at minimum cost. The U.S. never seriously 
entertained territorial ambitions there and never endorsed the use of force in this 
period. The American government benefited from British power and utilized the 
most-favored-nation clause to promote its interests, claiming the same rights and 
privileges for U.S. nationals that had been accorded to other treaty powers. On 
occasion in treaty negotiations the U.S. government took advantage of a China 
weakened by other powers to obtain special privileges through diplomatic effort. 
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The treaties, products of U.S. jackal diplomacy, had altered the position of 
Americans in China by the 1860s. However, with the start of the U.S. Civil War 
most American interests in Asia subsided. The United States, preoccupied with 
internal problems, did not have the material means to sustain its prior presence in 
China, and most Americans no longer cared. Isolationism remained a guiding 
principle of American foreign policy. Opposing involvement in Asian affairs, 
Americans diverted their attention from China toward their own continent. 
Part of the decline of U.S. interest in Asia also can be attributed to the decline 
of the opium trade resultant from the Opium Wars. Opium smuggling held little 
value for investment when compared with domestic opportunities provided by the 
war, westward expansion, and technological developments. Many merchants at 
mid-century pulled out of the China trade and became U.S. railway organizers. 
According to Fairbank, lithe China trade was an important source of capital 
accumulated for America's domestic development.,,34 
With this decline in China's commercial importance to the United States, the 
influence of merchants in the U.S. consular service was gradually reduced. In the 
early period merchants made up nearly all the population of foreign communities 
in China and therefore held posts within the U.S. government as merchant-consuls. 
As the foreign population in treaty ports became diversified because of the 
toleration clauses, U.S. consuls had new obligations to other Americans. The 
merchant-consuls were superseded by "political" consuls.35 
Although merchant interest in China appeared to be on the decline, the 
Chinese Empire was the target of impressive American missionary endeavors 
following the creation of the toleration clauses. There was an influx of Protestant 
missionaries who not only believed in the imperative of giving the Gospel to the 
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non-Christian world, but who were also now guaranteed to have some protection. 
Chinese officials were bound by the Treaty of TIentsin to safeguard the activities of 
U.S. citizens. In 1867 the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
committee, responding to America's westward expansion, urged missionaries to 
China by saying "the God of missions has brought this Empire, so populous, so 
idolatrous, nearer and nearer, that we may accept the field which He has assigned to 
us.,,36 
As increasing numbers of Americans answered this call, the missionaries had 
tremendous impact on American relations with China. In the words of historian 
Michael H. Hunt: 
It was the missionary with long periods of residence and 
unmatched exposure to the culture who developed the 
most impressive and widely recognized claim to expertise. 
More than any other Americans in China they were able 
to put their views before the public. The Chinese Repository, 
learned accounts, letters and reports in mission periodicals, 
and talks and interviews while on home leave provided 
the public a steady diet of missionary opinion.37 
The missionaries became a major influence on American attitudes and policies 
toward China. Through magazines such as The Chinese Repository and other 
media, they disseminated information concerning the laws, customs, history, 
literature, and current events of the Empire. 
Even though most preachers of the Gospel were not anxious to get involved 
in politics, what the missionaries encountered in China often struck them as so 
objectionable and contrary to religious teaching that it was difficult for them not to 
protest. In their impatience with the failure of the Chinese to respond to direct 
evangelism or even acts of service, American missionaries began to take an interest 
in diplomacy as a means of advancing the Christian cause. Some missionaries, such 
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as W.A.P. Martin, who served as an interpreter during negotiations of the 'Ii'eaty of 
Tientsin, even became personally involved in the making of China policy.38 Their 
actions had direct impact on Chinese society more than on policy-makers in 
Washington. 
Acting as interpreters of Chinese culture to the Americans, the missionaries 
also served to transmit American culture to the Chinese. Because they worked 
largely among the lower classes and were critical of traditional practices and 
institutions, the missionaries undermined the confidence of their Chinese converts 
in the political status quo. Conversion to Christianity was appealing to Chinese 
outcasts and criminals, and other marginal members of Chinese communities. 
Because the missionaries pragmatically manipulated societal flaws to win converts, 
their actions were often irritating to the local Chinese moral majority. The Chinese 
mandarin class realized that the missionaries jeopardized the whole Chinese social 
order by working with the segment of the population that presented the greatest 
danger of revolt. Missionary activities threatened the power base of the mandarins. 
The rural Chinese peasantry acted as a conservative force in Chinese society. They 
frequently misunderstood Christian doctrine, especially when the missionaries 
attacked Confucian precepts, and were irritated by the missionary's imposition on 
their daily routine. For these reasons missionaries were distrusted by the majority 
of the population and sometimes attacked by those hostile to their teachings and 
presence. 
The local Chinese often resented the flow of foreigners into their villages. 
The fact that China was forced to allow missionaries into the interior only under 
compulsion by Western military power "strengthened the old suspicion that 
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missionary work was at bottom a political movement.,,39 By admitting the religion 
of the Western nations the Chinese also admitted the political power and influence 
of those nations. Riots often occurred, raising problems concerning the protection 
of American citizens and property for American diplomacy. The cumulative effect 
of the dissension and rioting resulting from increased missionary activity put a 
serious strain upon the governmental machinery of the Empire. With the Qing 
Dynasty's existence threatened, the U.S. diplomats in Peking had to take a policy 
position. 
Several historians dispute the role of diplomatic legations in settling conflicts 
between missionaries and the Chinese. Paul Varg asserts that the government 
played a major role in protecting the activities of the missionaries: 
... the missionary's fate depended upon the power represented 
in the foreign legation in Peking. So strong and so continuous 
was the antagonism toward the missionary that he could never 
have attempted to Christianize the country had not the Western 
nations with their superior force upheld his right to be there.40 
Certainly the intervention by the West in Chinese affairs was onerous to the local 
Chinese, and therefore frequently opposed. The Toleration Clauses nominally 
protected the missionaries from strong opposition and symbolized Western 
intrusion; however, the active role of the Western governments in ensuring 
missionary privileges has been debated. Michael Hunt, writing on events during 
the same time period, contradictorily states: 
In the 1860s and early 1870s, diplomats in Peking withheld 
support for broad missionary pretensions on the grounds 
that missionary activity in the interior would weaken rather 
than strengthen the Chinese central government. The U.S. 
legation desired a strong Chinese government, and to 
unleash American missionaries would strain relations with 
China.41 
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A third perspective is offered by Kenneth Scott LaTourette: 
The Governments of Great Britain and the United States, 
under whose protection most Protestants naturally came, 
never supported the missionary as a means of furthering 
their influence in China. Often their representatives were 
disinclined to allow him the privileges which he claimed, 
and advised him to restrict his activities. They backed the 
missionary in maintaining his obvious treaty rights, but 
did this reluctantly and distinctly because he was a citizen 
of their country and not because of his occupation.42 
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Thus, both Hunt and LaTourette counter Paul Varg's supposition. The U.S. 
government may have pressured Chinese authorities to abide by the 1i'eaty of 
Tientsin, but did not take advantage of superior military might to further 
missionary causes. LaTourette does admit that the government of the United States 
was more favorable to the missionaries than Great Britain, and gives two main 
reasons. First, that several missionaries and former missionaries were in the U.S. 
consular and diplomatic service, and second, "there were less American commerce 
to be jeopardized by the ill-will which Christian propaganda excited." LaTourette 
relates the words of an American minister in China in 1876: "Missionary cases call 
for a large share of the efforts of the legation.,,43 
Michael Hunt, who had said diplomats withheld support for missionaries 
when the toleration clauses were first in effect, suggests that the policy in the foreign 
legation eventually transformed to one of veiled support of the missionaries' 
endeavors. The missionaries, "however imprudent their conduct and excessive in 
their expectations of assistance," were increasingly recognized by the legation as a 
valuable civilizing agent.44 The legation also worried that a missionary retreat 
from the interior, or appeasement of the Chinese on issues surrounding 
missionaries, would probably be hailed by the Chinese populace as a sign of 
--. 
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weakness, and might make the Chinese more belligerent towards all foreigners.45 
Despite these reasons, the legation only gave limited policy support to the 
missionaries because its prevailing diplomatic view remained that the missionaries 
were generating antagonisms with the potential to disrupt the development of the 
"vast" China market and weaken the Qing.46 Thus missionary motives were at 
odds with the interests of merchants and U.S. diplomats. 
So from 1860 until the late 1880s, the American government had further 
developed a policy that accommodated its needs. In its relations with the Qing, the 
U.S. still desired the protection of its citizens and an open field for commerce. The 
United States, as well as the other Western powers with interests in China, protected 
the Qing from Chinese rebellions and excessive missionary demands. The 
Westerners believed the Dynasty would adhere to the treaties it had signed after the 
Opium Wars, whereas other Chinese governments would not be legally bound. It 
was in the interest of commerce to maintain the Qing. Missionary and merchant 
interests were therefore at odds during this period. The government officially sided 
with the merchants, nominally supporting free trade in China despite the reality 
that the China trade had subsided. One account of the period declares that China 
comprised less than two per cent of the total export trade, and supplied only an 
insignificant fraction of total imports.47 
Merchant activity slumped in China from the 1860s to the late 1880s, but 
certain factors prevalent in the 1890s gave advocates of the China market new 
impetus. The Panic of 1893 was a propellant for American expansion across the 
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Pacific.48 Many businessmen suggested that as a consequence of the tremendous 
growth of industry since the Civil War the United States was suffering from 
overproduction, and the financial panic was a logical manifestation of that reality.49 
The domestic market was thought to be saturated by a surplus that could not be 
consumed at home and which would become greater as time passed. A conviction 
that American industry was dependent on foreign markets developed. 
China, until recently ignored by most Americans, again became viewed as a 
vast market possessing economic needs and presenting an opportunity for business 
interests. Although trade was relatively small throughout the 1890s, the market was 
perceived to be expanding and showed promise.50 China was thought by both 
businessmen and politicians to be a new frontier, one which would keep American 
commerce competitive with Europe and would relieve America's industrial glut by 
absorbing its surplus goods. 
By 1895 the United States executive began promulgating the benefits of the 
China trade and espousing principles which were later included in the Open Door 
Notes. President Grover Cleveland believed the government's role in the world 
was to lower the American tariff while securing equal access to desirable foreign 
markets, leaving the American corporations to compete with the other powers for 
the new markets emerging in the world. Given "a fair field and no favor" he 
confidently assumed that II American economic supremacy" could win its share of 
expanded markets without political and military burdens.51 
In the 1890s several key industries appeared to be proof of America's ability to 
win the China market. One of these was the cotton goods industry. China 
purchased nearly half of all American exports of cotton; the second-largest importer 
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took only a fourth as much. From 1887-1897 the American exports to China of 
cottons increased by 121 % in quantity and 59% in value, whereas exports from 
England and all other leading suppliers decreased in both categories. It appeared 
that the United States was capturing the Chinese demand, and the China market for 
cotton was second only to India. The cotton mills in the southern states staked their 
existence on this export. ''You can at once see what the importance of the China 
trade is to us," a convention of cotton spinners from South Carolina wrote their 
congressman in 1899. "It is everything. The prosperity of the cotton-mill business 
of South Carolina depends on the China trade.,,52 The South had more than one 
motivation for supporting the principles which eventually embodied the Open 
Door. China's importance to southern industry overlapped with the relevance of 
the missionary movement to the bible belt. 
The cotton goods industry was not the only industry dependent on the China 
trade. The volume of manufactured exports to China multiplied four times, from 
$3.2 million in 1895 to $13.1 million in 1899. Manufactured products accounted for 
90% of American exports to China; and this fact was significant to those concerned 
with American industrial overproduction. The flour, iron and steel, and oil 
industries would suffer losses if commerce with China was interrupted. Railway 
speculators' and trading houses' activities would be drastically curtailed if American 
investment and commerce suffered discriminatory treatment. The general business 
community would no longer be able to count on the potential market to relieve the 
overproduction problem. With so much at stake the business community was 
willing to pressure Washington when the China market became threatened. 53 
Charles Campbell argues the shift in U.S. policy toward interventionism was 
related solely to the increased lobbying efforts of the merchants with vested interests 
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in China in the late 1890s. William McKinley responded to the Europeans' rapid 
encroachments on the Chinese Empire with the pronouncement: ''It should be our 
settled purpose to open trade wherever we can.,,54 Keeping China open to 
American trade became, Campbell states, an issue of primary concern for the 
government.55 He credits the business community for putting China's importance 
before the American public and the McKinley administration. 
By the late 1890s U.S. business interests in China were in danger. The Russian 
and German spheres of influence in North China threatened to deny Americans 
opportunities for investment, trade, and political influence. The businessmen 
foresaw the potential partitioning of China and, believing that such a partition 
would destroy America's trading prospects, formed the Committee on American 
Interests in China. The purpose of this organization was to obtain a new Far Eastern 
policy from the government dedicated to the preservation of business interests. 
When Secretary of State Sherman in 1898 implied that a partition of China would 
not necessarily hurt American commerce, the Committee on American Interests in 
China began its campaign in earnest. The committee prepared a petition signed by 
businesses involved with the China trade, and sent this to the Chambers of 
Commerce of major U.S. cities, urging these organizations to demand of the 
government that the country's "important commercial interests" in China be 
safeguarded. According to Campbell, their actions alone put lithe whole subject of 
American interests in the Far East into a position of national prominence" and 
"stirred Sec. of State Sherman ... to send word to Germany and Russia that the United 
States favored 'open trade' with China.,,56 
-.-
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Campbell exaggerated the role of American business in the Open Door Policy. 
The Open Door was not founded on the whims of a narrow segment of the 
population with vested interests in China. However, the McKinley administration, 
faced with the possible partitioning of China, was assured of support from this 
influential segment of the American public. With diplomats, merchants, and 
missionaries now unified in their advocacy for a policy of firmness, McKinley and 
his Secretary of State John Hay could respond to the power struggle in East Asia with 
the Open Door Notes. 
As American investors and traders of the 1890s possessed a world view that 
linked their own expansionist interests to the economic development of China, 
missionaries also increased their activity in China, linking their private 
expansionism to the general improvement of mankind. In the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, a u new generation of Americans was looking outward, directed 
from the goal of saving America to saving the world."S7 These new missionaries 
were contemporaries of the new statesmen with the vision to desire American 
influence in international politics and the businessmen with their eyes on foreign 
markets. The American missionary effort in China had been revitalized in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, responding to the fear of spiritual stagnation. Just 
as theorists contended that overseas markets would alleviate the dangers of 
economic stagnation, overseas missions were sought to keep religious fervor at a 
revival level in the United States. The "conspicuous outpouring" of American 
Protestant missionary activity during the 1890s provided a "cultural counterpart to 
the American economic invasion."S8 
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The missionary movement itself had changed. Humanitarianism, 
nationalism, and imperialism had taken hold of the popular imagination in the 
1890s. The conversion of the heathen served as a "vent for the pent-up idealism" of 
the time, as it incorporated the new cultural and political goals.59 
According to historian Paul Varg, a transformation in missionary ideology 
occurred with the introduction of humanitarian sentiment in popular American 
culture. He says the "old view of the necessity of missionaries for snatching the 
heathen from the jaws of hell" was replaced with a "new view of missions as a 
humanitarian agency.,,60 By dropping their emphasis on hell and stressing the 
spiritual and physical benefits of the Christian Gospel, missionaries demonstrated 
the popularity of progressivism, which emphasized the dignity of man, human 
welfare, and the possibility of progress. The missionaries believed in the power of 
the gospel to emancipate men from degrading superstition and to introduce a 
higher concept of life. The missionary enthusiasts believed that Christianity 
accounted for what they considered the superiority of American society. To them 
this superiority was manifested in a greater concern for human life, in the professed 
rights of women, in the availability of free public education, in improved treatment 
of children, in care for the sick, and in the practice of moral virtues. This excerpt 
from the China Medical Missionary TournaI was characteristic of the humanitarian 
attitude held by the missionaries: 
When a man has become an inpatient in a hospital where 
he must lie in bed for several days or weeks, and while 
under treatment must observe unselfish, unpaid for, 
skillful attention from the Christian surgeon or nurse, 
he must begin to study about it. It is then his heart will 
melt and open. For the first time since he was born he 
will realize what benevolence is. This sense is fundamental 
to any apprehension of the Gospel. The Christ-like has 
dawned on the heathen. 
Still further, when the patient shall have recovered 
and returned to his home, he will carry the report and 
spirit of the place where he has found healing.61 
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Both the earlier Arminian interest in saving souls and the more progressive aspects 
of the social Gospel were apparent here. Cure for the sick became a means for 
converting the natives, and the conversion of heathen became a means to an 
improved society. 
The humanitarian motive for missionary work increasingly became endorsed 
by diplomats and presidents, and the missionary movement gained influential 
public support. Captain Alfred T. Mahan argued that the Western world had a 
common interest in bringing "the Asian peoples within the compass of the family 
of Christian states" through missionary activity. His argument sparked nationalist 
- fears when he warned of the possible danger if China were to become Westernized 
technologically without accepting "the mental and moral forces which have 
-
generated, and which in large measure govern, our political action.,,62 Mahan 
praised the work of missionaries because he believed they were inculcating the 
guiding moral principles of the West. With nationalistic pride Americans looked 
forward to China becoming a democratic nation guided by Christian ideals and 
closely allied with the United States. They believed that this strategic objective 
would reach fulfillment thanks to the endeavors of the missionaries. 
The missionary's sense of superiority and moral duty were derived from the 
new imperialism. Like the economic imperialists, the missionaries realized the 
satisfaction to be gained by developing the underdeveloped areas of the world in the 
image of one's own society. Notions of racial destiny and Anglo-Saxon superiority 
saturated missionary writings as Social Darwinism saturated Western ideology. But 
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25 
these beliefs coexisted with the optimism that racial and cultural virtues were 
transferable. Often challenging the popular theory of racial determinism which 
denied the possibility of reforming backward people, the missionaries argued that 
transforming foreign cultures was not only possible but was the duty of any true 
Christian. The missionaries felt morally obliged to proclaim the Gospel, as the 
words of Peter Matson attest: 
We were convinced of the literal truth of our Lord's promise 
that He would return when the Gospel had been proclaimed 
throughout the whole world ... Our emphasis was upon 
reaching as many people as possible in the shortest space 
of time.63 
The evangelical impulses of popular preachers, when mixed with the Christian 
concepts of stewardship and the new social sciences, led to the belief that 
Christianity could "alter peoples' environment, lift people above their genetic 
heritage and into the realm of 'civilization' .,,64 Furthermore, Christians were 
obligated to see that this took place. 
The only rationale which could justify the expenditure of life and funds in a 
missionary effort during this period of religious revival was the one which 
characterized the Chinese as being in desperate need of salvation.65 Missionaries 
were highly selective in their descriptions of Chinese life. The American observer's 
choice of topics was designed to depict the Chinese unfavorably. Missionary 
accounts emphasized their superstitious beliefs, strange customs, abnormal vices, 
and immorality. By stressing the unusual cruelties they inflicted on each other, 
their overcrowded cities, infanticide, and customs surrounding the life of women, 
the missionaries reinforced a Western sense of superiority. Although much of what 
they said was based on actual conditions in China, they gave only a partial 
--
26 
description. By including only what was necessary to cast the Chinese in the mold 
of a backward, barbaric people, the missionaries engendered distorted American 
perceptions of the Chinese.66 The missionary described the depths of Chinese 
heathenism in order to solidify the American comprehension of the Chinese as a 
strange race. 
The missionaries strongly believed they were uplifting Chinese society, and 
providing the natives with an opportunity to benefit by copying the superior 
cultural norms of the Western nations. Contrary to the expectations of these 
missionaries, their activities did not necessarily promote goodwill toward the 
United States. During the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, riots against 
foreigners occurred in China with increasing frequency. In the interior, missions 
were the most vulnerable to attacks, being the most obvious symbols of Western 
cultural aggression. Peter Matson gave the following account of his experience with 
mounting anti-foreign tension in 1892: 
Everything went peacefully until the middle of July 
when a fearful epidemic of cholera visited (Fancheng). 
Somebody started the rumor that the uninvited foreigner 
had poisoned the wells and thus caused the epidemic. 
This rumor spread like prairie fire and turned the ignorant 
populace into a state of fury ... 
One day I happened into an open space in front of a 
temple where theatricals were going on. Thousands 
were gathered together, and before I knew it the cry was 
raised 'Kill, kill, beat him to death, the foreign devil.' 
A shower of stones and bricks came down upon me. 
Behind me was a narrow lane. Through this I beat a 
hasty retreat ... 
The mob jammed each other in the narrow passage 
and I succeeded in getting a good lead on them. 
Unfortunately the people in the street got wind of 
the trouble and made ready to give me a hot 
reception. In a few minutes the whole town seemed 
to be after me ... 
--
I finally reached my house somehow, but no sooner 
was the door shut behind me than the mob filled the 
street and began to yell that they were going to tear 
down the house over my head and take my life. This 
they no doubt would have done had not God interfered 
by sending, in the last minute, two friendly officials 
with a company of soldiers who managed to disperse 
the rabble.67 
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Peter Matson's assertion that God interfered to save him in his time of need shows 
his level of faith, and the prevalent Christian mindset during this era. Americans 
often found themselves the victims of these anti-missionary activities. In the 
aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the activities against foreigners 
became more widespread.68 As Chinese riots continued, the pressures of 
missionaries demanding protection and retribution increased. 
Several pressures on the American government influenced a change in 
policy regarding missionary activities and disputes over missionary questions with 
the Chinese. Washington first moved its missionary policy in the direction of 
intervention in China on behalf of the missionaries upon the recommendation of 
the American legation in Peking. In 1891, Charles Denby, of the Peking legation, 
recognized a native conspiracy to drive the foreigner out of China that would have 
to be met, in his opinion, with "gunboat diplomacy." In response the U.S. 
government increased its naval patrol on the Yangtze.69 
Contributing to this diplomatic impulse toward intervention was the 
lobbying and propaganda effort undertaken by the missionaries themselves. To win 
the support of policy-makers, they argued that the Chinese character and culture 
required a missionary enlightenment. To retreat in the face of violence would 
betray the sacrifices of previous missionaries and forsake the obligations of a 
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civilized nation to halt barbarism?O While some missionaries accepted the 
violence as IIpart of God's great plan for blessing China," and willingly sacrificed 
their lives for God's work, others called for a more forceful reaction by the U.S. 
government?1 
Those missionaries desiring U.S. military intervention believed a Western 
invasion would create turmoil and weaken China's institutionalized resistance to 
Christianity. Convinced of their righteousness, some American missionaries were 
eager to get their views before the public. They readily granted interviews to 
correspondents, sent open letters to editors, and sent copies of petitions to 
Washington. Reverend D.Z. Sheffield suggested that a more "decidedly Christian 
government in Washington would permit U.S. troops to be employed in China.,,72 
He justified his call for vengeance on both theological and practical grounds, saying: 
It is not bloodthirstiness in missionaries to desire 
to see further shedding of blood, but an understanding 
of Chinese character and conditions, a realization that 
the policy of forgiveness means the loss of many 
valuable native and foreign lives?3 
He firmly believed that the Chinese would only cease their violence following an 
American display of force. A fellow missionary argued that force was necessary for 
retribution. His editorial, which appeared in San Francisco's Call, said: 1I ••• no 
punishment can be too severe for the murder of missionaries and innocent 
children. It is worth any cost in bloodshed if we can make millions of Chinese true 
and intelligent Christians.',74 Some of these public statements were so vindictive 
that they aroused public criticism, as the editor of this same issue of the Call 
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responded: ''These missionaries make a sorry spectacle of the kind of Christianity 
we seem to be exporting to Asia.,,75 
It was hard for Washington to determine the response of the American 
people on the issue of whether or not the government should intervene to protect 
the missionary. U.s. government officials were given no clear indication favoring 
either side, as some "howled for the heads of the Chinese rioters" and others felt 
that missionaries should either be willing to preach at their own risk, or should stop 
meddling in Chinese affairs.76 
Warren Cohen credits 'William Rockhill, an English member of the Chinese 
Customs Service, with advising Hay on America's Far Eastern policy. Cohen says, 
"Rockhill perceived the breakup of China would be a disaster for the balance of 
power in Asia. He believed the United States should use its new position in Asia 
and its growing influence in the world for the preservation of China's existence as a 
nation.,,77 Thomas McCormick retorts that this analysis "grossly overestimates the 
importance of a quite peripheral figure, whose ideas were wholly unoriginal and 
whose efforts in no way affected the timing of the Open Door Notes." 78 Since the 
early nineteenth century the U.S. government had espoused the principles 
contained in the Open Door Notes. While this continuity in policy should be 
stressed, it was only in the decade of the 1890s that the United States had the ability 
to promulgate its dedication to the preservation of U.S. interests internationally, or 
even perceived legitimate threats to those interests. Both Alfred Mahan, with his 
references to American nationalism, and Brooks Adams, who said "East Asia is the 
prize for which all energetic nations are grasping," placed great emphasis on the 
importance of the power struggle in Asia for the future of America?9 
-.-
. -
30 
Washington had to respond to missionary and merchant interests and 
China's strategic importance in the Great Power rivalry in a way that addressed 
America's needs, conformed to her ideals, and best suited her capabilities. A less 
confident nation might have participated in the scramble for territory, content to 
have an assured but small section of the Empire. However, the United States, with a 
small power base and little financial capital relative to the European nations, 
wanted more of the China market than partitioning would guarantee. Americans 
were convinced of their ability to win economic hegemony in China; this 
conviction stemmed from the export revival of 1897, the refinancing of American 
industry, the progress made by key industries in the China market, and the return of 
prosperity in the American economy.80 The maintenance of an American zone in 
China would intensify anti-imperialist sentiment while adding a bureaucratic and 
military burden on the McKinley administration . 
The first open door note safeguarded equal trading opportunity with China. 
The Open Door Notes embodied the agreement with France, Great Britain, 
Germany, Russia, and Japan, that China would be exempted from imperial 
competition. With the Open Door the U.S. could avoid entangling alliances with 
any other power. It made use of the "de facto balance of power between the Russo-
French entente and the emerging Anglo-Japanese bloc."81 
John Hay took advantage of the intense fear of world war that preoccupied 
the Europeans. The U.S. insisted on the status quo of free trade and Chinese 
sovereignty which Great Britain could no longer enforce. The Europeans worried 
that an imbalance in this status quo would lead to conflict, and so they acquiesced to 
the American policy . 
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The United States had adapted a foreign policy to its expansive needs. The 
"open door" became the appropriate means for the competitive industrial 
Americans to assure themselves of economic hegemony in Asia instead of "settling 
for a pittance.1I82 It would also maintain order and political stability, not in the old 
European fashion of political dominion and large-scale colonialism, but with open 
markets and Chinese territorial integrity. 
The Boxer Rebellion threatened the status quo that had just been endorsed by 
the concert of Western powers in their tacit approval of the Open Door Notes. Up 
until the Boxer Revolt missionaries and their denominational boards had enlisted 
the power of their government to pressure the Chinese officials to reprimand the 
attacks of secret societies against missionaries with beheadings. However, the Boxers 
eventually won the support of the Qing Dynasty, so the missionaries appealed to the 
U.S. for assistance in promoting the Christian Gospel, protecting American and 
Chinese lives, and maintaining order. The U.S. demonstrated its willingness to 
defend missionary rights when the Chinese government failed to protect American 
citizens under its treaty obligations. The Boxers laid siege, with the prodding of the 
Qing Empress CiXi, to the foreign legations quarter in Peking. In addition they 
wreaked havoc on the missionaries in the countryside. The confusion of the 
summer of 1900 can be seen in the following letter from the American Consul to 
Peter Matson as he fled his mission in Siangyang: 
1 P.M. 
Hankow, July 19, 1900 
Dear Mr. Matson, 
LYour letter was read this mom at 10 o'clock. .. arrived last 
night at 11.] Everything is quiet here, the British, Swedish 
consuls and myself have tried all mom to get a steam 
launch to go to meet you and the Jamesons party of 24 
--
-
that started from Siangyang at daylight the 12th. The 
Canadian Presbeterian [sic] missionaries (21) that were 
with Jameson had a desbrate [sic] fight and were robbed 
of everything near Nanyang ... 
Try and leave the note I send for James so it will be 
handed to him when they get where you are now. No 
news reliable from Peking as to what has become of all 
the foreigners there, including the minister (some name) 
killed June 16th and the last report was Peking burnt and 
all are killed. Can't tell whether we can send launch or 
not but will do our best-
But don't loose [sic] anytime getting here as trouble 
may brake [sic] out any hour. Can't you induce your men to 
work by offering a reward if they get you here at a certain 
time? 
A good many missions have been burnt at Hunan. There 
is another party of missionaries behind Jameson. Send 
them word that all is quiet but to loose [sic] no time. I 
would advise you after reaching here to hurry on to 
Shanghai. The Chinese are working like bees fortifying 
all along the Yangtze and especially at Chienkiang and 
we may get caught in a trap. Get here. 
Yours in haste, 
L. S. Wilcox, Consul83 
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With such information coming out of China, the Boxer Revolt awakened a 
widespread interest in the missionary question. Rev. W. S. Ament, an American 
missionary quoted during the rebellion as saying "the soft hand of the Americans is 
not as good as the mailed fist of the Germans," was not content with waiting for the 
slow-moving legal channels of diplomacy for vengeance. He instead cajoled 
American officers into permitting him to guide a squad of cavalry into the 
countryside in search of Boxers and their supporters. He "found houses that had 
been deserted but which bore evidence of Boxer occupation and they were duly 
burned." Captain Forsythe, the American unit's commander, later explained that 
"these bloodthirsty missionaries" wanted him to shoot "suspected Boxers on the 
spot and bum down the towns in which they were harbored.,,84 
---
33 
The Boxer Rebellion has been interpreted as a catalyst for this shift in 
government policy to aid the American missionaries devoted to uplifting China 
and advancing national influence. The Open Door Policy in the new era still reflects 
some American attitudes from the old. The Boxer Rebellion did not just serve as 
background to the enunciation of a more forceful policy, but also led to a re-
evaluation of American commitments. Because of pressure from other interest 
groups and a new administration's interpretation of the changing world power 
situation, Washington had already been prepared for intervention in China. 
The Boxer Rebellion aggravated merchant pressure for armed U.s. protection 
of commerce. Traders had lost their market, and prospective investors halted their 
activity. Most of the violence centered in North China and Manchuria, where the 
cotton goods industry had been most active, so the U.S. cotton textile enterprises 
were endangered. Terrified businessmen exclaimed "tens of thousands of American 
working men are interested in having our government do its share to bring back 
East Asia from utter anarchy."SS The American Asiatic Association of businessmen 
telegraphed Sec. Hay that "only immediate concerted action by the powers could 
prevent China from lapsing into such conditions as would nullify the recent Open 
Door Notes.,,86 
With the lives of American diplomats, missionaries, and businessmen 
threatened in China, the McKinley administration had both the resources and the 
will to protect the Americans and their interests against the Chinese. Sure of 
support from these segments of the electorate for a "strong policy" in China, four 
months before the presidential election McKinley sent five thousand soldiers to 
China and addressed a letter to the other Great Powers.87 This July circular stated in 
part: 
--
-
The policy of the Government of the United States 
is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent 
safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial 
and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed 
to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and 
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and 
impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.88 
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The actions of Americans in China, particularly merchants and missionaries, 
effected a policy transformation within the United States government which led to 
active governmental intervention and propagation of the principles of the Open 
Door. Missionaries and merchants cherished the opportunities China offered. Prior 
to the 1890s the U.S. government was reluctant to intervene in Asia on their behalf. 
It sought to maintain its interests without the use of force. But America's 
capabilities by the end of the century had changed, and new threats to the status quo 
had arisen. Thus the Boxer Rebellion showed a need for a more forceful diplomatic 
strategy, one that was already being considered by Washington. 
The McKinley administration's effective use of the open door was assisted by 
European imperialists and Chinese hostile to foreigners, because these two groups 
external to the United States helped to sway public opinion within the U.S. The 
Open Door was not a haphazard development; it was consistent with American 
idealism and the rhetoric of statesmen, missionaries, and merchants since the 
creation of the treaty port system. But American sentiment in the 1890s, pervaded 
by humanitarianism, nationalism, and imperialism, supported a new diplomatic 
strategy. America was no longer confined to the conduct of jackal diplomacy, but 
looking forward to the realization of a Pacific Destiny, and the Open Door is 
symbolic of how that was to be achieved. The Open Door Policy was a realistic 
policy which blended means and ends for the greatest U.S. advantage given the 
realities of America's power position in 1900. 
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